Geostrategic Daily

1 October 2026 · 28 of 600 items retained · 140 sources consulted
Chokepoints and sanctions are redrawing trade routes at once. The Strait of Hormuz closure, nearing its eighth month, is forecast to cost Jebel Ali and Khalifa their transhipment traffic permanently, while Ukraine's LNG imports now enter through four European gateways and Mozambique adds bunkering at Beira for Cape of Good Hope routings. Against that, Washington and Beijing agreed more favourable tariff treatment on around USD 30bn of goods each way, including coal, even as India contests tariff exposure under the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act. In Sub-Saharan Africa, cobalt quotas and DRC audit rules, plus a new Lamu refinery, show states converting resources into leverage.

Value chains & chokepoints

Modi, Trump review India-US cooperation in trade, defence, energy and critical technologies

The Hindu BusinessLine · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Prime Minister Narendra Modi had a telephone conversation with US President Donald Trump in which the two leaders reviewed progress in bilateral cooperation across trade, defence, energy, critical technologies and other areas, and reaffirmed their commitment to the India-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. The call took place amid heightened trade friction following the enactment of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which authorises tariffs of up to 100 per cent on nations purchasing Russian oil and gas, including India. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar raised India's concerns over the Act with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the UN General Assembly, and Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal is in the US to meet US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on the bilateral trade agreement.

Why it matters: The call sits within the briefing's trade and sanctions theme, as India seeks to advance a bilateral trade agreement with Washington while contesting tariff exposure under the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act.

sanctions export controls · great power rivalry
Also reported by: Bing News: sanctions Russia energy

Hydroxide standoff and broad decline: Q3 2026 Cobalt Price Review Increased DRC exports led to cobalt hydroxide prices (CIF Asia) falling 31% to across Q3 to $17.25/lb ($38,030/ton

Benchmark Source (Benchmark Mineral Intelligence) · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Cobalt hydroxide prices (CIF Asia) fell 31% across Q3 2026 to $17.25/lb ($38,030/tonne), while cobalt sulphate prices (EXW China) dropped nearly 30% to RMB 58,000/tonne, according to Benchmark's Cobalt Price Assessment. Increased DRC exports drove the decline, with DRC hydroxide imports into China exceeding 10,000 tonnes in June compared with roughly 2,000 tonnes in May. The hydroxide trade stalled in August, as no trades were confirmed in the ten days to 26 August and sellers were unwilling to transact below $20.00/lb.

Why it matters: The quarter's price falls show how DRC export volumes and Chinese downstream buying set terms across the critical minerals supply chain, leaving DRC customs processes and quota implementation as the swing factor for Q4 inflows.

critical minerals · supply chain risk

Congo to Audit Major Miners Annually From 2027 as Part of Local Content Drive, Regulator Says

The China-Global South Project · 30 September 2026 · permalink

The Democratic Republic of Congo will require annual audits of major miners, according to the report. The country's new cobalt export quotas are set to go live on 16 October, replacing a blanket export ban aimed at increasing global cobalt prices. China's National Development and Reform Commission has selected Guangyan International Investment Co. as a new investment vehicle to help expand access to strategic minerals abroad and secure its supply chain.

Why it matters: The audit requirement and the cobalt export quota change bear directly on the briefing's critical-minerals theme, since both alter the terms on which foreign firms, including Chinese investors, access Congolese cobalt.

critical minerals · supply chain risk · sanctions export controls

Ghana’s Mining Bill State Share Rules Could Reshape Mining Deals, Including China’s Zijin

The China-Global South Project · 1 October 2026 · permalink

Australia’s Assistant Foreign Minister Tim Watts will travel to Ghana later this month to intervene in a three-way controversy involving the Ghanaian government and a pair of mining companies. The text also notes that China’s aluminum smelters have been running at high output, with the Shanghai aluminum price near three-month highs, historically low raw material costs and strong margins. It further describes a gap between China’s engagement with ruling elites in Africa and concerns among civil society stakeholders over debt, environmental sustainability, trade and immigration.

Why it matters: The item sits within the briefing’s China-Global South theme, in which competition over African mining and metals supply chains is a recurring concern.

critical minerals · great power rivalry · supply chain risk

US dry bulk shipments to China jump 104% as trade relations improve

Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide · 30 September 2026 · permalink

US dry bulk shipments to China rose 104%, with coal shipments up 44% year on year and petcoke up 33%, though coal volumes remain 77% below 2024 levels. Panamax vessels carried 68% of cargo volumes from the US to China and supramax ships a further 28%. A round of US-China negotiations produced an agreement to provide more favourable tariff treatment for around USD 30bn worth of goods in each direction, covering coal and most grains but excluding soya beans, and China committed to importing at least 10m tonnes of US coal in 2027 and 2028.

Why it matters: The tariff agreement and China's coal import commitment bear on the briefing's trade theme, as they redirect US-China dry bulk flows and tonne-mile demand.

great power rivalry · supply chain risk

Asia-Pacific

Three More Tanker Attacks Surface in Delayed Hormuz Reports

gCaptain · 30 September 2026 · permalink

UK Maritime Trade Operations issued three separate warnings on Wednesday covering attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz that were reported on September 29 but not published until September 30. In the first case a crude oil tanker was struck on its port side by an unknown projectile, a second tanker transiting inbound was also hit by an unknown projectile, and the third warning said only that a tanker had been struck, with UKMTO not identifying the vessels or providing information on damage, casualties or pollution. The reports bring the number of recently disclosed time-late incidents to at least four.

Why it matters: The lag between incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and their appearance in the public record bears directly on the briefing's maritime security theme, since shipowners, crews and insurers must judge conditions there from an incomplete account.

chokepoint maritime · great power rivalry
Also reported by: gCaptain

How Indonesia can protect its interests in maritime cooperation with China

ASPI — The Strategist · 30 September 2026 · permalink

The article argues that Indonesia lacks a clear maritime cooperation strategy with China under President Prabowo Subianto, pointing to a 2024 joint statement recognising an overlapping claim in the North Natuna Sea and a 2026 joint naval passage exercise near Taiwan. It states that Chinese research vessels and coast guard have operated in the North Natuna Sea, that China protests Indonesian oil and gas exploration in the Tuna Block, and that Chinese research vessel Haiyang Dizhi 10 operated in Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands without consent. It proposes three steps for Jakarta: setting its own cooperation agenda and legal framework, limiting cooperation to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and domestic law, and diversifying partners including Japan, India, Australia and other ASEAN states.

Why it matters: The argument bears on maritime security and strategic competition, as Jakarta weighs economic partnership with Beijing against resource and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

chokepoint maritime · great power rivalry

The Geopolitics of AI in the Asia-Pacific

The Diplomat · 30 September 2026 · permalink

In an interview with The Diplomat, Jouko Ahvenainen says AI is increasingly connecting technology policy, national security, industrial policy, and geopolitics, and that this is especially visible in the Asia-Pacific. He argues the region should not be seen only through a China-U.S. lens, pointing to Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing, South Korea and Japan's positions in semiconductors and industrial technology, India's AI capabilities, and Singapore and ASEAN approaches to AI infrastructure, governance, and investment. He adds that China combines technology development with hardware manufacturing, industrial scale, and rapid deployment, and that AI is becoming a strategic capability and source of geopolitical power rather than simply a weapon.

Why it matters: The interview links AI to geopolitics, technology policy, national security, industrial policy, and supply chains, showing how Asia-Pacific technology competition shapes geoeconomic dependencies.

green tech supply chain · great power rivalry

The Future of Shipbuilding in Southeast Asia

The Diplomat · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Global shipbuilding demand is likely to remain resilient, with geopolitical conflict and uncertainty a primary driver, and Fitch Rating revised its sectoral outlook to “neutral” from “deteriorating” after the 2026 war between Iran, the United States and Israel. Global container volumes reached 16.2 million 20-foot-equivalent units in April, a 4 percent year-over-year increase, while analysts predicted fewer orders in 2026 and 2027 but geopolitical disruptions kept orderbooks strong. At the OECD-Southeast Asia Policy Roundtable on Shipbuilding, Steel, and AI in Tokyo in February 2026, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand agreed to a regional peer review of their shipbuilding sectors with the OECD, and the Philippines agreed to follow up on implementation pathways for OECD peer review recommendations.

Why it matters: The developments reflect the briefing's geoeconomics theme, as geopolitical conflict redirects shipbuilding demand and prompts Southeast Asian states to coordinate industrial policy through the OECD.

chokepoint maritime · supply chain risk

Airspace closed to nuclear fuel shipment bound for Bangladesh's Rooppur plant

Attaqa · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Pakistan declined to grant a uranium shipment permission to cross its airspace, without announcing clear reasons, delaying the arrival of uranium for the second unit of Bangladesh's Rooppur plant. Bangladesh's Joint Secretary at the Ministry of Science and Technology, Sheikh Muhammad Tawhid Islam, said the country had prepared to receive a nuclear fuel shipment from Russia on 24 September 2026, but the arrival was not completed and Rosatom informed the competent authorities. Bangladesh and Russia are awaiting a new date for the shipment, while the Bangladeshi Minister of Science and Technology, Faqir Mahbub Anam, said Russia and Rosatom proposed that the uranium shipment could arrive in the first week of October.

Why it matters: The delay bears on energy security, since Bangladesh relies on the plant's output to meet domestic demand while facing gas shortages that affect the power sector.

chokepoint infrastructure · great power rivalry

Europe, Eurasia & MENA

Moscow Sends Nuclear Warning to NATO as Tensions Rise in the Baltic

The Moscow Times · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Russia sent NATO a document, seen by Reuters, warning that it would be ready to use its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, if the alliance attempted to isolate the Kaliningrad region. The note accused NATO of a "dangerous and reckless course" carrying risks of direct armed conflict, and said Russian strikes against decision-making centres in member states were possible from the outset. NATO replied in writing that none of its exercises or activities threaten Russian territory, called on Russia to end its invasion of Ukraine and to cease its nuclear rhetoric, while Russian embassies in at least three European countries issued statements accusing NATO of escalating tensions over Kaliningrad.

Why it matters: The exchange places nuclear signalling over the Kaliningrad exclave within the briefing's European security theme, at a point when Russia's relations with European governments have sharply worsened.

chokepoint maritime · geostrategy military basing · great power rivalry
Also reported by: gCaptain

Trump Says He Is Still Considering Diesel Export Ban

Asharq Al-Awsat (English) · 30 September 2026 · permalink

US President Donald Trump said he has daily conversations about banning diesel exports, saying an export ban would have a negative impact on gasoline prices but could lower diesel costs. He said Russia's war in Ukraine, with strikes from either side affecting energy production and exports, is the main cause of rising diesel prices. The administration has weighed a blanket diesel export ban, voluntary export limits by refiners and broader sales of tax-exempt diesel, and has urged the European Union to release emergency diesel stocks.

Why it matters: The deliberations bear on energy security, since export restrictions and supply interruptions are being weighed as a means of lowering fuel costs.

supply chain risk · sanctions export controls
Also reported by: Middle East Eye

Hormuz closure a fatal blow for Dubai and Abu Dhabi transhipment volumes

The Loadstar · 30 September 2026 · permalink

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, approaching its eighth month, is predicted to cause the permanent loss of transhipment traffic at the UAE's two largest container facilities, Jebel Ali and Khalifa. Drewry senior associate Eirik Hooper said relay transhipment does not return once carriers have rebuilt networks around alternative hubs, because it follows network design rather than geography. Both DP World and AD Ports reported large declines in first-half volumes at Jebel Ali and Khalifa respectively, and DP World has taken a 50-year concession to build terminals outside Hormuz.

Why it matters: It indicates that conflict-driven carrier network redesign can permanently reallocate transhipment and logistics capacity within global supply chains, rather than producing a cyclical dip that reverses when the conflict ends.

chokepoint maritime · great power rivalry

Ukraine can play a key role enabling US energy exports to Europe

Atlantic Council · 1 October 2026 · permalink

Since 2025 Ukraine has moved from having no meaningful direct relationship with US LNG to becoming one of the fastest-growing purchasers of American LNG in Europe. Russian attacks on Ukraine's domestic gas production destroyed up to 60 percent of output capacity in 2025, prompting the state-owned Naftogaz to rethink its import strategy. Naftogaz has established four gateways for US LNG imports, at Poland's Świnoujście terminal, Lithuania's Klaipėda terminal, a floating terminal at Mukran in Germany, and Greece's Revithoussa terminal via the Vertical Corridor.

Why it matters: It bears on the energy theme: Ukraine's import gateways and its underground storage capacity of more than 30 billion cubic meters would give US LNG a distribution hub serving Central and Eastern Europe and support Europe's move away from Russian gas.

supply chain risk · great power rivalry

Afghanistan and Iran synchronize transport diplomacy: Implications for Central Asia

Eurasianet · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Iran is strengthening the Afghan dimension of its transport diplomacy while developing partnerships with Central Asian states, and Afghanistan is actively involved in expanding Eurasian overland routes. In June 2026, an Afghan delegation led by Deputy Minister for Railways Mawlavi Mohammad Ishaq Sahibzada visited Iran to discuss transport logistics infrastructure projects, including the construction of the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway. From March 2025 to March 2026, over 640,000 tons of cargo were transported via the Khaf-Herat railway, compared with fewer than 15,000 tons during the previous period.

Why it matters: This matters for geoeconomics because the expansion of Afghan-Iranian rail links and Central Asian transit routes alters overland trade connectivity and reduces reliance on maritime chokepoints.

chokepoint infrastructure · great power rivalry

Russia Attacks Ukrainian Energy Grid, Forcing Power Cuts as Winter Looms

Asharq Al-Awsat (English) · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Russia carried out a combined air campaign against Ukraine's energy grid, hitting power facilities and infrastructure around Kyiv and other regions, and Ukrainian officials said seven people were killed, among them a child. Ukraine's state grid operator Ukrenergo said it imposed emergency power cuts in Kyiv and three surrounding regions, and the air force said it intercepted 254 of 285 Russian drones deployed until early evening. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said critical infrastructure came under attack in five regions with further damage reported in another five, while Moldova's defense ministry said three drones crossed into its airspace and Romania and Poland scrambled military jets.

Why it matters: The strikes bear on the energy security theme, since damage to Ukrainian generation and grid infrastructure ahead of winter also produced spillover into neighbouring NATO states' airspace and flight operations.

supply chain risk · great power rivalry

Sub-Saharan Africa

DRC reforms mining code in hope of higher tax receipts

RFI Afrique · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Eight years after the mining code was promulgated, the government of the DRC is considering a new reform, with the state judging that mining revenue remains below the sector's potential even as output reached more than 3 million tonnes of copper and 220,000 tonnes of cobalt in 2025. Civil society organisations in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi recommend a reform that would allow the state to capture more mining revenue, and point to the roughly 60 taxes, duties and royalties that companies must pay. They also cite the exceptional tax regime of the mining company Sicomines, which the Ministry of Budget says costs the state nearly one billion dollars a year, and weak collection of the tax on excess profits.

Why it matters: The debate turns on fiscal policy: how far the state can convert rising mineral output into tax and royalty receipts.

critical minerals

Kenya: Dangote mega-refinery construction launched in Lamu before several African heads of state

RFI Afrique · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Construction of the Nigerian Dangote group's mega-refinery was launched on Wednesday 30 September at the port of Lamu, on Kenya's north-east coast. The Kenyan, Ugandan, Beninese and Togolese presidents and the Ethiopian prime minister attended the ceremony for a project aiming at 700,000 barrels of crude oil processed per day by 2030. Residents of Lamu county have filed a legal challenge against the project, and Aliko Dangote said he was not afraid of those who brought it.

Why it matters: The project bears on the briefing's energy theme, since it would link East African crude supply, refining capacity and reduced dependence on imported fuels.

supply chain risk

Oceania Bunkering to launch STS bunkering at Mozambique’s Beira Anchorage

Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Oceania Bunkering Mozambique will begin ship-to-ship bunkering operations at Beira Anchorage in October, supported by the 2,500-mt-capacity bunker barge Great Wall Energy, delivered in mid-September. The company will initially supply LSMGO and plans to add other fuel grades, including VLSFO, as operations expand later this year. The initiative is backed by the Mozambican state entities Petromoc and CFM Logistics, and the company already supplies marine fuels at Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Pemba and Quelimane.

Why it matters: It adds a bunkering location on the routing around the Cape of Good Hope, where longer voyages are raising demand for fuel supply along trade routes.

chokepoint maritime · supply chain risk

CoTec, Copper Intelligence sign agreement for DRC tailings

Mining Technology · 30 September 2026 · permalink

CoTec and Copper Intelligence have signed a definitive joint venture agreement covering the processing of historical copper tailings in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with two third-party investment vehicles associated with CoTec's CEO Julian Treger and chairman Lucio Genovese also involved. The joint venture will seek opportunities in the Central African Copperbelt, where large volumes of copper tailings have accumulated since the 1950s under the state-owned company Gécamines, and the new company will be incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. It plans to deploy CoTec's technologies on the tailings and redundant copper sites, and to secure funding from the US International Development Finance Corporation and other financiers once the portfolio reaches sufficient scale.

Why it matters: The agreement adds a processing-based route into copper and cobalt supply from the Central African Copperbelt, a theme of critical-minerals supply chains.

critical minerals

Ghana Commodity Exchange seeks bigger role in shea trade as government pushes local processing, tightens export controls

bne IntelliNews · 30 September 2026 · permalink

The Ghana Commodity Exchange is pressing the government to require part of the country’s domestic shea trade to pass through its platform, a proposal its chief executive Evelyn Abakah outlined at the World Shea Expo in Tamale on September 15-17. The Tree Crops Development Authority has introduced a minimum producer price of GHS9.01 per kilogram for the 2026 crop season and requires exporters to obtain permits for shea and other regulated tree crops, while President John Mahama has said the government wants roughly 50% to 60% of shea, cashew and rubber production processed locally each year. Processors support greater domestic value addition but differ over the pace of restricting raw exports, with Ghana Shea Employers Association President Rabiatu Abukari proposing that exporters be allowed to ship about 20% to 30% of production.

Why it matters: It shows how trade policy and value-chain upgrading in agricultural commodities are being pursued through market infrastructure, minimum prices and export permits rather than outright bans.

sanctions export controls · supply chain risk

‘It tied our hands,’ George Kamal on KQ’s missed opportunities as he exits

The Africa Report · 30 September 2026 · permalink

George Kamal has resigned from the board of Kenya Airways, referred to in the source as KQ. It took more than one attempt for him to convince the board that he was serious about resigning. The source's headline quotes him saying ‘It tied our hands’ in reference to missed opportunities at the airline as he exits.

Why it matters: The departure draws attention to corporate governance at a state-linked carrier, where board turnover bears on the airline's ability to act on commercial opportunities.

critical minerals · supply chain risk

Americas

Hertha Metals raises $133m to build iron plant in US

Mining Technology · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Hertha Metals has secured $133.65m in Series A funding to build a plant in the US producing high-purity iron for domestic rare-earth magnet manufacturers. The round includes a $65m equity investment from the US Government through the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment programme and the Economic Defense Unit, and was co-led by Doerr Capital and Khosla Ventures. The capital will fund Hertha Chalyx, a proposed facility designed to produce 10,000t of steel-grade and magnet-grade iron, with construction set to begin later this year.

Why it matters: The round speaks to the critical minerals theme, since the plant is intended to establish a domestic supply of high-purity iron used in neodymium iron boron magnets.

critical minerals · great power rivalry · supply chain risk

Trump unveils US$200b South Korean investment in US; Seoul hedges on Alaska pipeline

The Straits Times · 30 September 2026 · permalink

US President Donald Trump announced on Sept 30 that South Korea would invest about US$200 billion in US projects, the first major projects under a US$350 billion strategic investment package agreed in a 2025 trade deal. Seoul confirmed investments of US$22.3 billion in a Texas gas-fired power project and US$120 billion for eight nuclear reactors, but said the US$54 billion Alaska LNG pipeline would proceed only if certain commercial and legal conditions are met.

Why it matters: The announcement shows energy security and alliance-based investment commitments being negotiated together, with Seoul attaching commercial and legal conditions to the Alaska LNG project.

great power rivalry · supply chain risk
Also reported by: Le Monde International

Go Ahead Given for Canada LNG to Double Capacity

The Maritime Executive · 30 September 2026 · permalink

LNG Canada and its investment partners have decided to proceed with Phase 2 of the Kitimat, British Columbia export operation, about 15 months after exports began. The expansion will add two LNG trains, increasing total production capacity from 14 to 28 million tonnes per annum, and includes an additional storage tank, condensate tank, loading berth, and expanded utility and process systems. Fluor Corporation, in a joint venture with JGC Corporation, has been selected to deliver engineering, procurement, fabrication, construction, and commissioning for the project.

Why it matters: The expansion bears on energy security, as it adds LNG supply aimed at the growing Asian market amid projected increases in global demand.

supply chain risk

IRGC letter to American voters is desperate smokescreen, US says

The National (UAE) · 30 September 2026 · permalink

The US State Department dismissed an open letter from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the American public as a smokescreen aimed at hiding the effects of military action against Tehran. The IRGC issued the 26-page letter on Tuesday, urging Americans to reject President Donald Trump's policies before November's midterm elections. The State Department's Rewards for Justice programme separately offered up to $15 million for information that disrupts the financial network of the IRGC's Aerospace Force.

Why it matters: The exchange shows the US–Iran confrontation being conducted simultaneously through information operations and financial enforcement measures.

chokepoint maritime · great power rivalry

Goodbye, ‘China Plus One’: The Real Change in US China Policy

The Diplomat · 30 September 2026 · permalink

President Donald Trump greeted President Xi Jinping at Joint Base Andrews on September 23 for a state visit, and at their May summit in Beijing the two leaders agreed to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability. References to China Plus One have nearly vanished in Washington, and China-U.S. trade fell by around 30 percent in 2025 alone, according to the McKinsey Global Institute.

Why it matters: The change in Washington's vocabulary indicates that US-China relations are being reframed around strategic stability rather than decoupling.

sanctions export controls · great power rivalry · supply chain risk

Writing the Playbook: A Strategy and Doctrine for American Economic Security

War on the Rocks · 30 September 2026 · permalink

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a framework for economic statecraft, delivered to the Economic Club of New York and outlined in the Wall Street Journal, centered on five principles including national capacity, reciprocity, and financial leadership. In April, Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Feinberg formally established the Pentagon's Economic Defense Unit, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's National Security Economic Theory program aims to put geoeconomics on a more quantitative and rigorous theoretical footing. The article states that the doctrine to follow, which would guide the strategy's implementation, is yet to be developed.

Why it matters: The piece argues that economic statecraft now has a senior-level strategy but no implementation doctrine, leaving the coordination of executive, legislative, industry, and academic efforts unresolved.

supply chain risk · sanctions export controls · great power rivalry